

## *Revisiting Some Aspects of the Fakir-Sannyasi Rebellion in North Bengal 1763-1800*

MITHUN KUMAR SAHA

Associate Professor, Department of History, University of Dhaka

**Abstract:** The gravity of the armed conflicts of the forty year-long Fakir-Sannyasi Rebellion was felt mostly in northern Bengal. Why so? It is necessary to understand the local aspects of this armed struggle within the structure of the whole movement. This paper aims to unearth the reasons of the Fakirs and Sannyasis' travel to North Bengal. How far has the topography of northern districts served the rebels in their armed struggle? To what extent religious and economic interests guided their actions? What initiatives did the East India Company administration take to bring to end the '*dakaiti*' of the Fakirs and Sannyasis? Company records, reports and documents, district gazetteers and some other colonial documents have been scrutinized along with some significant research works to find answers to these queries. Following the qualitative research methodology this paper concludes that the terrain and economic interests chiefly invited the wandering mendicants in North Bengal.

**Key Words:** Pilgrimage, Rent-free Land, Silk Trade, Terrain, Hideout, Military, Police.

The Madariya Fakirs and the Dasnami Sannyasis depended on their *Akharas* and *Maths* along with pilgrimages for supporting themselves. They received alms from the people and enjoyed rent and revenue free land tenures from the Mughal administration. Their unhindered ways of life faced sudden intrusion after the Company imposed rent on these estates from 1759.<sup>1</sup> The government also intruded on their beliefs, practices, rights and privileges. This intrusion on the Fakir-Sannyasi's age-old lifestyle compelled them to launch an armed resistance against the Company state. Records indicate that Fakirs alone launched at least 30 attacks in the 1770s. Sannyasi activity decreased considerably after 1780, while Fakir activities increased several fold.<sup>2</sup> They primarily raided factories of the East India Company and revenue offices of the zamindars.<sup>3</sup>

North Bengal, being remote with relatively less central authority was preferred by the rebels as their home ground. The locals were supportive towards them. However, government steadily but forcibly encountered the situation with strategies and deployments that could cope with the environmental reality of this region. Effective deployments include establishing permanent and temporary military and police posts in strategic locations, continuous pursuit of the rebels through patrols and spying on them using local agents. Through these initiatives and other tactics government suppressed this movement by the dawn of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

This study has mostly depended on primary sources such as East India Company records, reports and documents, district gazetteers, accounts of Bengal, Rennell's *A Bengal Atlas* and memoirs and biographies of Company officials. The research of Jamini Mohan Ghosh, A. N. Chandra, Ananda Bhattacharyya, N. Majumdar and others have been crucial for an understanding of the issues. Other secondary sources were extensively consulted. As this article is investigative in nature, eventually it has followed qualitative research method.

### **Defining North Bengal**

The present-day taxonomic geography of North Bengal is not only a geographical expression but a historical development of a geo-historical concept which came into being (as North Bengal) in a process of transition in different forms as Pundravardhana, Gouda, Varendra, Uttariya, Uttardesa, Kamtabihar, 'Uttarbanga', 'Uttarkul', 'Uttara' appear in various ancient and medieval texts.<sup>4</sup> None of these terms indicate precise boundaries. The political and administrative boundaries of a region might often be fluid and this is true of North Bengal. Its borders have at times expanded or contracted, and various internal administrative changes have occurred, especially during British rule.<sup>5</sup> Despite the many shifts in its boundaries, in the early phase of colonial rule, the

term 'Northern Bengal' was used geographically, which later changed to 'North Bengal'.

What are the boundaries of North Bengal? Roy Choudhury defined the "North of the main branch of the Ganges, now known as Padma and west of the Brahmaputra lies the extensive region" of North Bengal "which embraces the modern Rajshahi Division and the state of Cooch Behar."<sup>6</sup> Ananda Gopal Ghosh, following Akshay Kumar Maitra, identified North Bengal with the eight districts of the Rajshahi division, along with parts of the Purnia and Goalpara districts.<sup>7</sup> Till 1947, the Rajshahi division included the districts of Rangpur, Rajshahi, Dinajpur, Malda, Pabna, Bogra, Jalpaiguri, and Darjeeling. In this paper, the land mass of the aforementioned districts is meant to be described as North Bengal which serves as the setting for examining some aspects of the Fakir-Sannyasi Rebellion within its boundaries. Since this rebellion is an event of the late 18th century, coinciding with the early period of British rule, the discussion also occasionally includes relevant places and events outside the defined boundaries of North Bengal.

### **(1) Fakir-Sannyasi: Why in North Bengal?**

Warren Hastings in his minutes to the Council indicates Sannyasis' route to North Bengal from North India goes as follows: "... they chiefly frequent the countries lying at the foot of the chain of mountains which separate Hindustan from Tibbet, wandering continually from the Gogra river in the domain of the vizier (Oudh) to the Burramputter and from this line occasionally penetrating into Euracpoor [Gorakhpur], Butsea [Bettiah], Tirhoot, Purnea, and Rungpur..."<sup>8</sup> This paper argues that the Sannyasis and Fakirs frequently visited the territories of North Bengal for the following reasons:

#### **i. Pilgrimage**

Fakirs and Sannyasis traditionally traveled to holy sites as part of their spiritual practices. Given that many sacred sites

for both Fakirs and Sannyasis existed across places of India like Ayodhya and Bihar, places of pilgrimages in North Bengal lie very close to these areas and it was natural for them to travel between these locations. This travel often brought them to North Bengal.

Among Fakirs, the Madariya Fakirs or Burhana Fakirs were known to make pilgrimages through a circular route across North India, East India, and various shrines in Bengal. Fakirs often visited Shah Madar's shrine in Kanpur, the shrine of Syed Muhammad Jamaluddin in Bihar, and various shrines in Purnia before continuing to the dargahs in Bengal. The shrines of Peer Badruddin at Hemtabad and dargah of Mullah Alauddin near Damdama in Dinajpur, Nekmard's dargah in Thakurgaon, the Shah Sultan Balkhi shrine in Mahasthangarh, dargah of Turkan Sayyid at Bogra town as well as Baba Adam at Adamdighi, Bogra, Adina Mosque and Bari Dargah of Saint Shah Jalal at Pandua held particular importance in North Bengal.<sup>9</sup> After visiting the dargahs of North Bengal, Fakirs would either return to North India and Nepal via Bihar or travel to other pilgrimage sites in East Bengal. Essentially, the shrines and sacred sites in North Bengal acted as a link between the religious sites of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh to the west and the holy sites of East Bengal to the east.<sup>10</sup> Van den Broucke's map shows a road connecting Rajshahi with Pabna, Bogra, and Rangpur extended northward from North Bengal going towards Assam, which may have served as a route for Fakirs and Sannyasis on pilgrimage.<sup>11</sup> Therefore, it is beyond doubt that Fakirs used to travel to North Bengal throughout the year, visiting the Sufi and other revered sites to participate in festivals, *urs* (anniversaries), and other religious gatherings.

For Hindu ascetics, pilgrimage throughout the year holds deep spiritual importance. From Prayag, Haridwar, and Benares in North India to Bogra in North Bengal, these ascetics traveled across sacred sites to attend the Kumbh Mela, bathing festival (*snan utsab*) in the Ganges, the same festival at Mahasthan (Bogra) and different places along

Karatoya river banks, and take part in ceremonies such as the Ashok Ashtami at the Brahmaputra River. Their journeys also included visits to Janakpur, birthplace of Sita, and Puri. Generally, after the Kumbh Mela, they traveled eastward, passing through Ayodhya and northern Bihar, reaching the Terai region near Nepal. From Janakpur, they headed north to Purnia, crossed the Mahananda River, and entered Rangpur in North Bengal. From Rangpur, they would participate in the Baruni festival at Mahasthangarh.<sup>12</sup> Besides bathing in the Karatoya, another major reason for their presence in North Bengal was the bathing festival in Brahmaputra at Chilmari. The Sannyasis also used to celebrate Shiva Ratri at Jalpesh in Jalpaiguri and Bhagalpur in Bihar.<sup>13</sup> For this purpose, they had to travel through the districts of North Bengal. In addition to these sacred sites, North Bengal was also home to sannyasis travelling to a temple of Rani Bhawani Thakurani, a Shakti Peeth of the goddess Tara in Bogra, where many ascetics gathered year-round under the management of the Rajbari of Natore.<sup>14</sup>

## **ii. Economic Interest: The Other Face of Pilgrimage**

In North Indian society, the number of people who subsisted mainly on income from religious office was large. Only religious mendicants of all sorts accounted for 5 per cent around 1880 and the percentage was certainly greater a century earlier.<sup>15</sup> The scenario was probably very similar to the case of North Bengal. Recent research works<sup>16</sup> has shown that the Fakirs and Sannyasis of these two ascetic traditions roamed North Bengal for both spiritual and material needs. Those among the Fakirs and Sannyasis who were permitted to marry and lived settled or monastery-centered lives were also engaged in economic activities aimed at personal or collective capital growth, such as investment, trade, and profit-making enterprises, alongside their spiritual practices.

### **(a) Land Grants**

Fakirs-Sannyasis were assured of receiving alms from the people and relied on donations, often receiving rent and

revenue-free land grants from local landlords or *inam* lands from Mughal rulers. During the Mughal period, the system of *madad-i-maash* or subsistence land grants enabled some Fakirs and Sannyasis to acquire lands classified as *ayma*, *pirutar*, *brahmottar*, and *debottar*.<sup>17</sup> These revenue-free lands provided them with a steady but permanent source of family income. Even they were also permitted to confiscate heirless land in the region.<sup>18</sup> According to Atis K. Dasgupta, some Sannyasis were granted such revenue-free land in the 18th century by small zamindars in regions like Malda, Dinajpur, and Mymensingh in Bengal.<sup>19</sup> There are several examples of such grants in the districts of North Bengal. Apart from *lakhiraj* and *wakf*, the records of rent-free land tenures in kinds of *debottar*, *brahmottar*, *vaishnavottar*, *sannyasottar*, *sivottar*, *vishnottar*, *ganakottar*, *jogiashan*, *aima*, *pirpal*, *piran*, *fakiran*, etc. were available in the districts of Malda, Rangpur, Dinajpur, Rajshahi, Bogra, Pabna. In Bogra, land grant in 1666 for Mahasthanagarh shrine measuring some 650 acres as *Pirpal* Estate from the Governor of Dacca by a Sanad is well recorded.<sup>20</sup> Another fact to be considered in this context is the most number amongst such rent-free land tenures were found in *parganas* Silbarasa and Khatta in this district.<sup>21</sup> Malda perhaps records the highest tenure of lands as well as grants to different sects of the society, fakirs and sannyasis being the most among the recipients. In Malda, taraf Pirigpur in *pargana* Shershahbad, with an area of 5000 acres was conferred to priest Sayyid Niamatullah by Emperor Aurangazeb.<sup>22</sup> In *parganas* Hatanda and Gaurhand, total 7015 acres of land, above 6 percent of total lands in these *parganas* were rent-free.<sup>23</sup> Only *lakhiraj* tenures below 100 bighas were so huge in Rangpur that might have produced a revenue of Rs. 94,177.<sup>24</sup> In 1790 British officers estimated that land with a total rental value of Rs. 384,000 was given rent-free for religious and charitable purposes in Rangpur.<sup>25</sup> Rent-free land tenures in Dinajpur estimates 32,920 acres.<sup>26</sup> It is reasonable to claim that maintaining such estates of

Fakirs and Sannyasis in North Bengal also required their presence in this region.

### **(b) Investment and Trading**

Apart from managing immovable property, another significant reason for the movement of Fakirs and Sannyasis, particularly the Sannyasis, in North Bengal was to safeguard their business interests. Their commercial activities included both capital investment and profit-making enterprises as well as the import-export of goods. A section of Sannyasis had been involved in money-lending businesses since the Mughal period. Some zamindars in Bengal borrowed money from Sannyasis, and there are also instances of farmers taking loans from them. This trend continued during the early decades of British rule. Ananda Bhattacharyya, based on company records, has shown that zamindars named Pratap Narayan of Sherpur in Bogra, Khairullah Chowdhury of Chakla in Rangpur, and zamindar of Pukhuria in Rajshahi borrowed cash from Sannyasi moneylenders. According to the rules of money-lending, the borrowed principal amount, along with agreed-upon interest, had to be repaid by these zamindars. Prominent Sannyasis involved in money-lending in North Bengal were Bhaktiyar Giri, Baput Giri, Man Giri, Domar Giri, and Ganpat Giri.<sup>27</sup> There were also some Sannyasis engaged in personal and monastery-controlled import-export businesses. Sannyasis played a crucial role as stakeholders in the extensive trade network that connected North India, Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan, and Bengal. The monasteries of the Sannyasis acted as local outposts or agents within this vast trade network.<sup>28</sup> Sannyasis used to export silk fabrics from Bengal, particularly from North Bengal. Rajshahi silk was one of the most traded commodities in prominent commercial centers like Benares, Mirzapur, and Ghazipur. Primarily, Gujarati Sannyasi merchants controlled the Rajshahi silk trade. Malda silk and mixed cloth (cotton and silk), elatchee and musroos were also traded by the Gosain or Sannyasi merchants. The prominent Gosain

merchants of Malda were Mahant Majgir, Gosain Sannalgir, Gosain Dasgir, Gosain Bhairavgiri and Mahant Keshargiri.<sup>29</sup> Other than raw silk and silk fabrics, cotton textiles from Bengal were exported to Nepal, Bhutan, and Tibet through Sannyasis.<sup>30</sup> Similarly, gold, silver, precious stones, and spices were imported into Bengal through these Sannyasi merchants. Government records mention Fakirs and Sannyasis involved in trade in Bengal. Apart from those in Malda were Govinda Giri, Beni Giri, Mahant Man Giri, and Subal Giri.<sup>31</sup> Therefore, it can be unequivocally asserted that, alongside their religious duties, the Fakirs and Sannyasis traveled through North Bengal for economic interests.

It is noteworthy that fairs held during religious festivals, such as those in Benares, were significant opportunities for Fakirs and Sannyasis to engage in import-export trade. Like the Benares fair, several fairs and religious festivals were held in North Bengal on the occasion of different celebrations round the year. As already mentioned, it is unsurprising that Fakirs and Sannyasis participated in the commercial activities surrounding fairs like the *Nekmard Mela*. Apart from *Nekmard Mela* (held at Bhawanipur village of *pargana* Salbari, now under Ranishankail police station of Thakurgaon), numerous annual fairs and religious gatherings were seen to be held in Dinajpur. Amongst them, the Alwar Khawa fair on the occasion of Raspuṇima in *pargana* Salbari on October/November; the Daldighi fair in Gangarampur in the latter half of February; and the Sontapur fair on the last week of April were attended by about twenty thousand people from different areas.<sup>32</sup> Religiously connected five such fairs were also noticed in parts of Malda district. These were Ramkail fair (mela) held in the month of June near old Gaur, Kuris mela (swimming festival) on the bank of the Ganges in February or March, Kansat mela in February-March on the bank of the Ganges, Tulsi Bihar mela in Jungle-Tuta in April attended mostly by the sannyasis and Pandua mela in November attended by four-five thousand fakirs.<sup>33</sup> In Rajshahi, three great fairs had religious importance along



with some other fairs. Fair at Premtoli, Gaur in Aswin month to celebrate the anniversary of the visit of Sri Chaitannya in Gaur; annual fair on the occasion of Hindu festival Sri Nabami in March or April on the bank of Atrai in Manda attended by about fifteen thousand people; and fair on the second day of the month of Rozah centered on Bagha Mosque founded on the land, an endowment of Emperor Shah Jahan.<sup>34</sup> In addition to these fairs, Shahzadpur fair of Pabna saw a great number of attendees along with fakirs and sannyasis.

### **(c) Sufficiency Attracts the Wandering Mendicants**

‘The great famine of 1769-70’ in Bengal was one of the worst experiences of human loss to date. The districts of North Bengal were somehow relatively less affected in comparison with the districts of Lower Bengal, Murshidabad division and Bihar province. The Central Committee indicating better situation in North Bengal, bitterly remarked in a letter to the Supervisor of Bihar: “Your neighbours, enjoying the blessing of almost a plentiful season, whilst you are suffering the evils of dearth and famine...”.<sup>35</sup> It is assumed that Rangpur was probably the least famine affected district in 1769-70 as “no information is obtainable showing the extent to which the terrible scarcity of that year was felt in this district (Rangpur)”.<sup>36</sup> So, there are reasons to believe that the wandering and resident Fakir-Sannyasis might have assembled in large numbers in famine and post-famine years in the districts of North Bengal for food and other stuff (subscription and others). This assumption is duly supported by the events of increasing number of pursuits and skirmishes of the Company soldiers with the Fakir-Sannyasis in northern districts took place after 1770 onwards.


### **(d) Terrain: While Alternative Shelter**

A close examination of the clashes between the Company-zamindars’ well-equipped forces and the Fakir-Sannyasi groups shows that the Fakir-Sannyasis deliberately avoided

conventional battle tactics. The confrontations between the two sides were primarily marked by pursuits and counter-pursuits. The armed activities of the Fakir-Sannyasis were distinctly aligned with guerrilla warfare tactics, specifically resembling the hit-and-run approach. It is well understood that the implementation of such strategies requires natural advantages, such as suitable hiding spots and relatively inaccessible terrain. Now, let us examine the regions of North Bengal where the Fakir-Sannyasis operated and explore what geographical advantages these areas provided for them.

In the riverine regions of North Bengal, including the chars (sandbanks) of the Brahmaputra, Teesta, Karatoya, Atrai, Mahananda, Punarbhaha, Dharla, and their tributaries, movement was highly challenging for the Company's troops. Lieutenant Anslie of the Company reported to the authorities that the large rivers and muddy terrain made it extremely difficult for the troops to traverse these areas. Additionally, the frequent route changes by the Sannyasis and Fakirs made it nearly impossible for the soldiers to capture them easily.<sup>37</sup> The chars of these rivers, along with the dense jungles and hilly regions of Rangpur, Dinajpur, Malda, Rajshahi, and Bogra, served as safe havens for the Fakir-Sannyasis. The jungle of Mahasthangarh, the forests on the north-western frontier of Malda, the jungles of Gour, the forests of Boda, the woodlands of Panga, the forest of Jayantia Ghat (in Khansama Thana), the jungles of Jharbari, Babrijhar, Kachua, Singheswar, and the dense forests of Kishoreganj were considered impenetrable.<sup>38</sup> Additionally, the sal forests of Sherpur and Panchbibi in Bogra, the jungles of *pargana* Shilbarsa, the Battrishazari jungle of Rangpur<sup>39</sup> and the sal forests of Dinajpur and the jungles of Ghoraghat<sup>40</sup> served as key sanctuaries. The tract of country lying south of the stations of Dinajpur and Rangpur, and west of the present districts of Bogra, towards the Ganges, was, according to the reports of the Company servants, "a favourite haunt of these *banditti*, being far removed from any central authority".<sup>41</sup> Beyond the forests in these districts of North Bengal, the

Fakir-Sannyasis could also take refuge in areas like Jafarshahi and Jangalbari (near Bajitpur) in Mymensingh, the hilly regions of Jamalpur, and the forests of Madhupur in



Tangail.<sup>42</sup> The Baikunthapur forest in Jalpaiguri, the Morang jungles, and the hilly and forest areas of Assam, Nepal, and Bhutan are well-documented as shelters for the Fakirs and

Sannyasis.<sup>43</sup> Jamini Mohan Ghosh informs that the Fakirs also sought refuge in the fort of Durrup Deo at Rahimganj, located in Jalpaiguri.<sup>44</sup> In reality, the enormous area of the jurisdiction and the weakness of the administrative staff made the maintenance of order in the remoter parts of the northern districts a very difficult matter. These areas offered great facilities for refuge not only for the dacoits, but also for the Fakirs and Sannyasis.

## **(2) East India Company Wins the Race**

According to the Code of Manu, a king is reckoned among the worst of criminals who receives his revenue from his subjects without affording them due protection in return.<sup>45</sup> It's not known to us this day whether this code of Manu was at work in the Company state while facing the 'marauders' or not. Now it is proved to us that the Company ran into serious financial trouble during the early 1770s, as the speculative bubble in London caused by the acquisition of the diwani burst. A decade later, military costs began to outstrip revenue throughout British ruled India and brought the Company into debt once more.<sup>46</sup> So, they wanted to establish 'authority' as well as 'law and order' by hook or crook and increase its income by 'every means.' Thus, the violent resistance of the Fakir-Sannyasi rebels was dealt with the counter-violence, particularly after 1773 by the Company government. It dispatched military expedition against the rebels into their hideouts where they were either killed or captured. They were later enslaved or sent off to the lunatic asylums<sup>47</sup> or publicly hanged. These victories, however, did not come easily to the Company troops. North Bengal terrain was not only unknown to the Company officers but was also problematic for the sepoys as well. The land was intersected by numerous big or small rivers and a greater part of it remained inundated throughout the years because of the swamps and marshes. Some of the rivers were quite unnavigable; others could be used only seasonally. On top of this, the monsoon season in Bengal was particularly treacherous as it lasted for months, turning this region even more aquatic. Military officials,

therefore, were forced to withdraw their detachments during this season.<sup>48</sup> The Company army had difficulties negotiating a path through the wild animal-infested dense jungles as well. Non-cooperation and mistrust of the locals due to the 'White peril'<sup>49</sup> must have impacted the Company initiative to curb the rebels. Even after these realities, the Company government finally won. How?

Although the armed activities of the Fakir-Sannyasis which began in the 1760s came to the notice of Company administrators, it seems they were not considered highly sensitive until the killing of Captain Keith, Mr. Myrtel and Captain George Thomas by the Fakir-Sannyasis, along with being informed of Rennell's serious injuries caused by the same people.<sup>50</sup> Following the famine, the disruption of revenue collection in Bengal, particularly in North Bengal, due to the Fakir-Sannyasis' raids deeply alarmed Governor Hastings. He wrote: "Every year during the cold season a human plague descended upon Bengal. Bands of wandering beggars came down from hills and ravaged the country far and wide...Incursions going for centuries...people an excellent excuse for withholding the land revenue."<sup>51</sup> As Warren Hastings assumed Governorship, there was rapid increase in internal disorder in Bengal. Crime, dacoity, vagabondage grew by leaps and bounds. By that time, the Company had become the *de facto* ruler of Bengal.<sup>52</sup> To suppress dacoits and other criminals and to implant 'authority', he adopted stringent measures in 1772, as encapsulated in the 35<sup>th</sup> Regulation of 1772, "...that every such criminal on conviction, shall be carried to the village to which he belongs, and be there executed, for a terror and example to others: for the further prevention of such abominable practices, that the village of which he is an inhabitant shall be fined...the family of the criminal shall become slaves of the State."<sup>53</sup> In 1773, Hastings' administration went further with other measures including disarming all travelers that finally applied only to fakirs and sannyasis, expel order for fakirs and sannyasis

from the province, directives to zamindars and farmers not to provide the 'human plague' with shelter and support, instruction to provide information regarding the movement and location of the mendicants defiance of which was seriously punishable. Despite these measures, Hastings was unable to take even more definitive action against the armed activities of the Fakir-Sannyasis at that time. This was because the Company did not achieve full sovereignty until 1813. Although the Regulating Act of 1773 and the India Act of 1784 were in force, in practice, the Nawab remained a *functious officio* until around 1790.<sup>54</sup> Thus, Hastings' hands were often tied. Moreover, there was a tacit reluctance within the Company to adopt measures that would significantly increase operational costs in Bengal.<sup>55</sup>

Alongside suppressing other crimes, the government took diverse measures from 1773 onward to confront the Fakir-Sannyasis. One of these measures was the criminal justice system. The government entrusted the *faujdars* with the responsibility of ensuring the safety of the inhabitants and maintaining peace. Local zamindars and peasants were tasked with assisting the *faujdars* in this effort. A declaration was made holding zamindars and peasants accountable if they failed to fulfill their responsibilities.<sup>56</sup> Establishing police stations (*thanas*) in various districts was also a part of the criminal justice reforms. In 1776, the government decided to establish *faujdari* police stations in Murshidabad, Godagari, Dinajpur, Rangpur, and Ghoraghat.<sup>57</sup> Such measures were absent during the Mughal and Nawabi eras when zamindars held similar powers and responsibilities. During those periods, ensuring the safety of tenants (*raiyyats*) fell under the purview of the respective zamindars.<sup>58</sup> However a letter from the Company's Committee of Circuit in 1772 reveals that the primary objective of the *faujdari* system was to eradicate all dacoits and similar criminals from Bengal.<sup>59</sup> When these measures failed to achieve their objectives, Cornwallis later implemented new reforms.

## **Military Deployment**

The Company employed two primary strategies in this effort: by utilizing permanent military bases in Bengal and nearby provinces, the Company government wanted to block the entry of the Fakir-Sannyasis into North Bengal. The second strategy covered tracking, chasing, and punishing Fakir-Sannyasi groups that were already operating or had entered various parts of North Bengal. In 1765, three brigades were formed for the protection of Bengal. These brigades were stationed at Munger, Allahabad, and Bankipur.<sup>60</sup> The following year, six new battalions were established as *pargana* battalions in various districts of Bengal to strengthen the military presence. One of these battalions was permanently stationed in Rangpur (in 1767) under the command of Captain Mackenzie, followed later by Captain Thomas. Due to their small numbers, the *pargana* battalions were soon deemed less effective. In 1768, they were withdrawn from the *parganas*, reinforced with additional troops, and redeployed to various border areas.<sup>61</sup> By 1776-77, permanent military bases had been established in Bogra's Shilbarsa, Murshidabad's Berhampore, and Sahibganj in Jharkhand. These bases formed a strategic configuration resembling the English letter 'V' when viewed from the confluence of the Ganga and Brahmaputra rivers. Additionally, the government deployed the "Corps of Light Infantry" in Purnia and nearby districts.<sup>62</sup> Even with these measures, the Company struggled to establish internal order in the province. The activities of the Fakir-Sannyasis increased significantly after 1770, prompting the government to form new 'Provincial Battalions.' By 1803, these battalions were stationed in Purnia, Chittagong, Patna, Murshidabad, and Dhaka.<sup>63</sup>

Aside permanent bases, the government set up military outposts in several locations in North Bengal. In 1771, a military outpost was established at Mahasthangarh. In 1782, similar outpost was set up in Rajshahi. Another base was established in Mymensingh in 1786.<sup>64</sup> To prevent Fakirs from

fleeing to Nepal, troops were stationed at the northeastern border in Surjapur *Pargana* in Dinajpur district.<sup>65</sup> In 1783, forces were deployed near the shrine at Nekmard to disrupt Fakir gatherings. The Company also maintained a troop presence in Khansama, Dinajpur.<sup>66</sup> According to Hunter, after 1782, the Company's military power in Bengal became firmly established. By this time, the government had even set up a military base in Tezpur, Assam.<sup>67</sup> The strategic placement of these bases shows that North Bengal was surrounded from the northwest, south, and east. Bases in Rangpur, Dinajpur, Rajshahi, and Bogra were likely designed for immediate deployment when necessary.

After acquiring *Diwani*, the East India Company began replacing local troops with a smaller number of Company soldiers. This was done both to curtail the power of the Nawabs and to implement the Company's cost-reduction policy.<sup>68</sup> However, as law and order deteriorated, the government had to increase the number of Company troops and work towards establishing permanent military bases across the province. The government quickly realized that Fakir-Sannyasis did not use fixed locations or routes. Consequently, the strategy adopted was to pursue and attack them wherever they moved. To this end, troops were deployed temporarily from permanent military bases as needed. In December 29, 1772, Captain Thomas led a company of soldiers in Nilphamari to chase the Sannyasis. At the same time, Captain Stuart took position on the western bank of the Teesta River to intercept them. Captain James defeated a group of Sannyasis on the eastern bank.<sup>69</sup> In 1784, Company troops pursued a large group of Fakirs along the Dinajpur-Rangpur route. In 1787, Lieutenant Brennan's forces chased down and killed Bhavani Pathak and his followers.<sup>70</sup> Fakir-Sannyasi groups operating in Rangpur and Dinajpur often sought refuge in the forests of Baikunthapur, Jalpaiguri to evade the Company troops. In 1782, Lieutenant MacDonald led an expedition into the Baikunthapur forest. A similar



operation was conducted there in 1789. In 1794, following the reports of Sannyasi raids in Baikunthapur and Nilphamari's Kazirhat Chakla, the government deployed troops. At present-day Sannyasikata near Siliguri, a battle ensued where the Sannyasis were defeated.<sup>71</sup> The Company's operations involved continuous offensive tactics. Troops regularly patrolled Rangpur, Dinajpur, Rajshahi, and Bogra, aiming to root out Fakir-Sannyasi activities in the swampy and forested areas. Such patrols and sudden attacks increased significantly after 1793. By this time, Fakir groups led by Sobhan Shah in the Rangpur-Dinajpur area sought refuge in the Baikunthapur forest. As narrated by Glazier:

In 1789, we have an account of a large body of bandits who had occupied the Baikunthapur forest, which lies at the northern apex of the district, right under the hills, whence they issued on their predatory excursions. The forest was composed of tree jungle interwoven with cane, and was impassable except by narrow winding paths, known only to the robbers. The collector got together a force of two hundred *barkandazes* and held all the entrances into the forest. Several skirmishes ensued, but months elapsed before any decisive result was obtained. The marauders were at length starved out; some escaped into Nepal and Bhutan, but great numbers were captured, including their leader and several of his principal associates. Within 12 months in this and other parts of the district, the collector arrested and brought to trial 549 dacoits.<sup>72</sup>

The Baikunthapur forest became the main sanctuary for Fakir-Sannyasis. Recognizing this, the government conducted sustained operations in the area over several years. A local officer and 25 troops were stationed permanently near the forest, while similar units were based in Nilphamari's Dimla and Fakirganj. By 1807, the Company government succeeded in clearing the Baikunthapur forest of Fakir-Sannyasis.<sup>73</sup> This marked the virtual end of anti-government activities by Fakir-Sannyasis in the region.

### **Deployment on Waterways**

The Fakir-Sannyasis, particularly the Naga Sannyasis, used the Ganga, Ghaghara, and Kosi rivers to enter North Bengal from the northwest. Following this river route, they traveled via the Teesta River and then used the Brahmaputra River. Using these waterways, they traveled to North India, Bihar, Rohilkhand, Ayodhya, and East Bengal. To obstruct the movements of the Fakir-Sannyasis along these routes, the government deployed special forces from Rajshahi to Shibganj along the Ganga-Brahmaputra route.<sup>74</sup> In Rajshahi, other than the government military and police deployment, records provide information that the zamindar, Raja Ram Krishna maintained 12 patrol boats on the various rivers to protect the country from 'dakaites and armed fakirs'.<sup>75</sup> Police stations near the river banks, like Godagari police station, were also assigned with patrol duties on waterways.

### **Police and Criminal Justice**

The pre-British role of the zamindars in the indigenous system of justice is well-known as they adjudicated both civil and criminal cases in the mufassil courts.<sup>76</sup> The village staff under zamindars possessed the same dual character like zamindars: collector and police-magistrate.<sup>77</sup> Practically, zamindars were the primary recourse for maintaining peace and order at the local level. After 1765, changes occurred in this system. One significant and lasting impact of the dual governance system was the unprecedented increase in disorder and anarchy in localities. The situation became even more precarious when the Nawab disbanded all his troops in 1770.<sup>78</sup> This chaotic state of the country might have attracted various bands of Sannyasis and Fakirs. To address this situation, the government soon took steps to strengthen the policing system. Fourteen police stations (thanas) were established in 1774 within the Faujdari system. Godagari police station was the only one established in North Bengal in this phase.<sup>79</sup> This police station was situated on the south of Malda-Rajshahi Ganga River route where Ganga meets

Mahananda river. As the need grew, the number of police stations increased to twenty-six in the same year, along with the establishment of twenty-four *chaukis* (outposts). Even then the jurisdiction of each *Fauzdari* thana extended over an area of 80 or 100 miles and in many places as far as 120 or 140 miles.<sup>80</sup> In 1779, three more police stations and four additional outposts were established. At this phase, a thana was established in *pargana* Shilbarsa of Bogra.<sup>81</sup> A police camp was set up at Dogachhi near Baliadighi in Thakurgaon around this time.<sup>82</sup> Hemtabad Police circle (thana) of Dinajpur was established nearby.

It is worth mentioning that zamindars were regarded as the natural guardians of rural peace within this criminal administration framework.<sup>83</sup> Now zamindars once again assumed a role in maintaining peace and order at the local level and the government allowed zamindars to get a yearly allowance. In Rajshahi, at the time of Decennial Settlement in 1790, an allowance of *sikka* rupees 36,926 was made to the zamindar Raja Ram Krishna for policing purposes. The greater part of this sum, however, went towards guards for the zamindar's revenue courts and escorts for his treasure. Only Rs. 16,000 of the total allocation appears to have been devoted to maintaining police for general peace. The criminal police were employed in patrolling the towns and market places. In 1801-2, the district was partially guarded by 'sibandi corps' or militia police. The ordinary district police were distributed over twenty-seven police-circles (thanas).<sup>84</sup>

By 1790, the police establishments of collectorates numbered twenty-three, nineteen in Bengal and among them three in North Bengal: Rajshahi, Rangpur and Dinajpur. At this time, how many local thanas and people were employed under a collectorate, may be well presumed with the example of the district of Burdwan. In the whole district, there were 2400 *paiks* under the thanadars for the express purpose of police. But exclusive of this guards there was a separate establishment of *paiks* no less than 19000 in number.<sup>85</sup> It

appears that there were at that time 36 thanas and within these thanas a total number of 446 subordinate outposts were operational in Burdwan.

Lord Cornwallis set himself to the task of organizing a police force for the province. On the 7th December 1792, the Governor-General-in-Council passed the 'Regulations for the Police of the Collectorship in Bengal, Behar and Orissa.' Regulation no. 7 stated: "The darogahs are authorized to apprehend without charge and without issuing the dustuck or writ...".<sup>86</sup> It indicates the power of a daroga in apprehending people suspect of committing any crime. The Police re-organization came to be more disciplined under the new scheme of Police introduced by the Regulation XXII of 1793. This regulation had divided the country into police jurisdictions of 20 miles square where it was previously around hundred miles square. This initiative of the Government extended the capacity of the district police. For example, Rangpur local police circle in 1793 consisted of only 38 native officers and 268 footmen.<sup>87</sup> But, after the Cornwallis initiative, Rangpur district police circle extended to 24 police circuits (thanas) in 1809.<sup>88</sup> It is notable that each thana or circuit was staffed with 34 people at the early phase of the police establishment under Hastings.<sup>89</sup> If we look to the number of staffs under Burdwan district police around 1790, it may produce an idea of the number of people under Rangpur district police along with the other districts of North Bengal at the beginning of 19<sup>th</sup> century.

In addition, under the Regulation XXII of 1793, a daroga was capacitated with armed men and empowered to apprehend on a written charge. The pausbauns, pykes and other descriptions of village guards established were placed under the authority of the daroga. They were allowed 10 rupees from the government on the conviction of every dacoit or gang robber apprehended by them and 10 per cent on the value of stolen property recovered provided the thief be apprehended.<sup>90</sup> The incentive given to them on conviction of

the 'dacoits' must have impressed them also to apprehend the Fakirs and Sannyasis alongwith.

Another development regarding the criminal justice was establishing new 14 jails, entirely of brick buildings. Rangpur and Dinajpur got their new jails in this distribution while Rajshahi already got it in 1787. In March 1793, in an official correspondence, John Shore declared that the judicial and police administration had remarkably improved during the last few years.<sup>91</sup>

Alongside the police system, the Company government established its own intelligence network during this period. Although the intelligence department was formally created through the Resolution of 1792, intelligence agents had been utilized under the direct instructions of Company authorities long before that to track the locations and movements of the Fakir-Sannyasis. They often used couriers (*harkaras*), boatmen, and ferry workers. In 1770, Ducarel, the Supervisor of Purnia, hired *harkaras* to gather information about the movements of the Sannyasis along the Kosi River. Based on the information provided by these spies, Lieut. Sinclair was able to capture approximately 500 Sannyasis.<sup>92</sup> The Commissioner of Cooch Behar was instructed by the Company's authorities in Calcutta to maintain surveillance over the Fakir-Sannyasis. All *faujders* were directed by the government to appoint messengers to track the destinations and movements of the Fakir-Sannyasis and to maintain strict surveillance over all ferry crossings.<sup>93</sup> In the Rangpur-Dinajpur region, particularly to monitor the activities of Majnu Shah, the government employed salaried spies on a monthly basis.<sup>94</sup> The government even began offering rewards to apprehend Fakir leaders. For instance, a reward of 4,000 rupees was offered for information regarding Fakir leader Cherag Ali.<sup>95</sup>

## **Conclusion**

North Bengal became the focal point of the Fakir-Sannyasi rebellion that lasted for more than four decades. One of the reasons for this could be the presence of a large number of resident Fakirs and Sannyasis there. The Fakirs and Sannyasis seem to have had the support of the masses of North Bengal from the beginning of the movement. Otherwise, it would not have been possible to continue the armed movement for such a long time. The people base that the Fakirs and Sannyasis achieved must have been due to their engagement with the worldly realities and otherworldly aspirations of the natives. Because of the association of the Fakir and Sannyasis with significant land ownership in North Bengal, their involvement in local, inter-provincial and international trade, there must have been ample interaction with local people. The government could not sever that relationship by force.

The characteristics of the terrain North Bengal contributed to the longevity of the movement. Numerous rivers, canals and other form of waterbodies and surrounding forests, along with large numbers of people provided easily accessible hideouts for the rebels. It can be claimed that the natural shelters beyond North Bengal, like jungle and mountains of Nepal and Bhutan, gave them additional refuge. To chase them effectively, the government gradually expanded its army and police force. In contrast to the guerilla nature of the Fakir-Sannyasis, the company army very skillfully followed the fortress concept of defense arrangement and a kind of mobile warfare strategy.

The government employed its armed detachments on permanent or temporary basis in almost all the strategically important places of North Bengal and increased surveillance and intelligence efforts. From the 1780s, this extensive network began to bear fruit and the rebels were put under great pressure. The government finally managed to put a stop

to the rebellious activities of the Fakir-Sannyasis in North Bengal from 1793 onwards.

The economic perspective of the Fakir-Sannyasi movement in North Bengal reveals that on one side of this struggle was the interest group of the hugely profit and revenue mongering global capital. On the other side was part of the groups active to preserve the existence of local capital. Both sides denied each other from the start. It was this denial and defiance that gave rise to the armed struggle. This struggle was supported by local peasants although it was not a peasant struggle by any means, but a community struggle.

### Notes and References

---

- 1 Amrita Sengupta, "The Sannyasi-Fakir, Chuar and Rangpur Rebellion(s)", in *An Earthly Paradise Trade, Politics and Culture in Early Modern Bengal*, ed. Raziuddin Aquil and Tilottama Mukherjee, (Delhi: Manohar, 2020), p. 524.
- 2 Sirajul Islam, *Banglar Itihas: Upanibesik Shasankathamo, 1757-1947*, (Dhaka: Bangla Academy, 1984), p. 282.
- 3 For details, consult Jamini Mohan Ghosh, *Sannyasi and Fakir Raiders in Bengal*, Calcutta: Bengal Secretariat Book Depot, mcmxxx (1930); A. N. Chandra, *The Sannyasi Rebellion*, (Calcutta: Ratna Prakashan, 1977); Ananda Bhattacharyya, *Sannyasi o Fakir Bidraho*, (Kolkata: Ashadeep, Reprint in 2022).
- 4 Abdul Momin Chowdhury and Ranabir Chakravarti (ed.) *History of Bangladesh Early Bengal in Regional Perspectives (up to c. 1200 CE)*, Vol. 1, (Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 2018), pp. 18-21.
- 5 For more detailed discussions on North Bengal's borders and boundary changes, see *A Summary of the Changes in the Jurisdiction of Districts in Bengal 1757-1916*, West Bengal District Gazetteers, (Calcutta: Department of Higher Education: Government of West Bengal, 1999).
- 6 R.C. Majumdar, (ed.), *The History of Bengal*, Vol. I, (Dhaka: The University of Dacca, 1943, Fourth Impression, 2006), p. 2.
- 7 Ananda Gopal Ghosh, "Upanibesik Amoler Uttarbanga (1765-1947)", in *Manonrekha*, Vol. 6, No. 10, ed. Mizanur Rahman Nasim, (June 2022), p. 83.
- 8 Jamini Mohan Ghosh, *Sannyasi and Fakir Raiders in Bengal*, (Calcutta: Bengal Secretariat Book Depot, 1930), p. 18.
- 9 W. W. Hunter, *A Statistical Account of Bengal*, Vol. VIII, (Delhi: D. K. Publishing House, 1974), p. 190; Amrita Sengupta, op. cit.

- 
- 10 Ananda Bhattacharya, "Sannyasi and Fakir Rebellion in Bihar (1767-1800)", Accessed through [https://www.muslimsocieties.org/Vol6\\_2/Sannyasi\\_and\\_Fakir\\_Rebellion.pdf](https://www.muslimsocieties.org/Vol6_2/Sannyasi_and_Fakir_Rebellion.pdf), 41. Last Accessed on 17. 12.2024.
  - 11 Md. Rezaul Karim, "Fakir Sannyasi Movement in Rajshahi: Regional Study of a Pioneer Peasant Resistance in Colonial Bengal", in *Journal of social Science*, (Rajshahi: Rajshahi College, July 2021), p. 71.
  - 12 Nikhil Sur, *Chiyattarer Manantar o Sannyasi-Fakir Bidraho*, (Kolkata: Subarnarekha, 1982), pp. 50-51.
  - 13 Ananda Bhattacharyya, "Reconsidering the Sannyasi Rebellion", *Social Scientist*, Vol. 40, No ¾ (March-April 2012), 85; Accessed through <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41633803>, Last Accessed on 17. 12.2024.
  - 14 W. W. Hunter, op. cit., p. 191.
  - 15 C. A. Bayly, *Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars: North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansion 1770-1870*, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 126.
  - 16 For details, consult Ananda Bhattacharyya, *Sannyasi o Fakir Bidraho*; Amrita Sengupta, "The Sannyasi-Fakir, Chuar and Rangpur Rebellion(s)"; Atis K. Dasgupta, *The Fakir and Sannyasi Uprisings*.
  - 17 Sirajul Islam (ed.), *History of Bangladesh, 1704-1971*, Vol. 1, (Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 2nd edition, 2017), p. 108.
  - 18 Amrita Sengupta, op. cit., p. 523.
  - 19 Atis K. Dasgupta, *The Fakir and Sannyasi Uprisings*, (Kolkata: K.P. Bagchi & Co.,1992), p. 10.
  - 20 W. W. Hunter, op. cit., p. 196.
  - 21 Ibid., pp. 240-41.
  - 22 Ibid., p. 83.
  - 23 Ibid., p. 85.
  - 24 Ibid., p. 283.
  - 25 Jon E. Wilson, "A Thousand Countries to Go to: Peasants and Rulers in Late Eighteenth-Century Bengal", in *Past & Present*, No. 189, (Nov., 2005), 100, Accessed through <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3600750>, Last Accessed on 24 February 2025.
  - 26 W. W. Hunter, op. cit., p. 400.
  - 27 Ananda Bhattacharyya, op. cit., pp. 85-86.
  - 28 Ananda Gopal Ghosh, *The Factory of the English East India Company at Malda (1765-1833)*, PhD Thesis, (Malda: University of North Bengal), pp. 203-204.
  - 29 Ananda Bhattacharyya, "Reconsidering the Sannyasi Rebellion", op. cit., p. 88.
  - 30 Ibid., pp. 83, 87.
  - 31 W. W. Hunter, op. cit., Vol. VII, pp. 387-388.
  - 32 Ibid., pp. 67-68.



- 
- 33 Ibid., Vol. VIII, pp. 56, 88.
- 34 Ibid., Vol. IX, pp. 136-140.
- 35 W.W. Hunter, *Annals of Rural Bengal*, (London: Smith Elder and CO., 1897), pp. 45-49.
- 36 W.W. Hunter, Vol. VII, p. 293.
- 37 A. Mervyn Davies, *Life and Times of Warren Hastings Maker of British India*, (Delhi: Gian Publishing House, 1988), p. 104.
- 38 W. W. Hunter, *A Statistical Account of Bengal*, Vol. VII, VIII & IX, op. cit., see *Ferae Nature* part of the respective districts; A. K. M. Nasir Uddin, *Nilfamarir Itihas*, Vol. I, (Rangpur: Md Abdus Sattar (Publisher), 1975), p. 38.
- 39 W. W. Hunter, op. cit., Vol. VII, p. 195.
- 40 Ibid., p. 366.
- 41 J. A. Vas, *Eastern Bengal and Assam District Gazetteers: Rangpur*, (Allahabad: Pioneer Press, 1911), p. 28.
- 42 Ananda Bhattacharyya, *Sannyasi o Fakir Bidraho*, op. cit., p. 274.
- 43 J. A. Vas, op. cit., p. 29.
- 44 Jamini Mohan Ghosh, op. cit., p. 53.
- 45 W. R. Gourlay, *A Contribution Towards A History of The Police in Bengal*, (Calcutta: Bengal Secretariate Press, 1916), p. 9.
- 46 Jon E. Wilson, op. cit., p. 86.
- 47 Kymberly C. Brumlik, "Lunacy for Profit: Economic Gains of the 'Native-Only' Lunatic Asylums in the Bengal Presidency, 1850s-1870s", in *Journal of South Asian Studies*, 2014, p. 3, accessed through <http://www.escijournals.net/JSAS>; Waltraud Ernst, "Medical/ Colonial Power – Lunatic Asylums in Bengal, c. 1800-1900", in *Journal of Asian History*, Vol. 40, No.1(2006), (Harrassowitz Verlag, 2006), p. 61, accessed through <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41933429>.
- 48 Amrita Sengupta, op. cit., p. 532.
- 49 Elizabeth Kolsky, *Colonial Justice in British India White Violence and the Rule of Law*, (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 27-68.
- 50 Jamini Mohan Ghosh, op. cit., pp. 39, 40, 50.
- 51 A. Mervyn Davies, op. cit., pp. 103-104.
- 52 W. R. Gourlay, op. cit., p. 16.
- 53 Walter Keily Firminger (ed.), *The Fifth Report*, Vol. I, (Calcutta: R. Cambray & Co., 1917), ccxxiii-iv.
- 54 N. K. Sinha (ed.), *The History of Bengal (1757-1905)*, (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1996), p. 76.
- 55 N. Majumdar, *Justice and Police in Bengal 1765-1793*, (Calcutta: Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyaya, 1960), p. 31.
- 56 Walter Keily Firminger (ed.), *The Fifth Report*, op. cit., ccxlvii.
- 57 N. Majumdar, op. cit., pp. 324-25.

- 
- 58 W. W. Hunter (ed.), *Bengal MS. Records, Vol. I*, (London: W. H. Allen & Co. LD., 1894), p. 15.
- 59 W. R. Gourlay, op. cit., p. 26.
- 60 Jamini Mohan Ghosh, op. cit., p. 31.
- 61 Ibid., p. 66.
- 62 Ibid., p. 67.
- 63 Ananda Gopal Ghosh, op. cit., p. 266.
- 64 A. N. Chandra, *The Sannyasi Rebellion*, (Calcutta: Ratna Prakashan, 1977), pp. 43, 94, 102.
- 65 Ananda Bhattacharyya, *Sannyasi o Fakir Bidraho*, op. cit., pp. 248-49.
- 66 A. K. M. Nasir Uddin, op. cit., p. 42.
- 67 W. W. Hunter, *Bengal MS. Records*, op. cit., pp. 15, 206.
- 68 N. Majumdar, op. cit., p. 25.
- 69 A. K. M. Nasir Uddin, op. cit., p. 40; Jamini Mohan Ghosh, op. cit., pp. 46, 50.
- 70 E. E. Glazier, *A Report on the District of Rungpore*, (Calcutta: Calcutta Control Press Company, 1873), pp. 88-89.
- 71 A. K. M. Nasir Uddin, op. cit., pp. 42-43
- 72 E. E. Glazier, op. cit., pp. 88-89.
- 73 J. A. Vas, op. cit., p. 30.
- 74 Ananda Bhattacharyya, op. cit., p. 236.
- 75 W. W. Hunter, *A Statistical Account of Bengal*, Vol. VII, op. cit., p. 100.
- 76 Walter Keily Firminger (ed.), op. cit., Vol. I, 77; N. Majumdar, op. cit., p. 37.
- 77 N. Majumdar, op. cit., p. 51.
- 78 Ibid., p. 80.
- 79 W. R. Gourlay, op. cit., p. 23.
- 80 N. Majumdar, op. cit., p. 145.
- 81 Ibid., p. 193.
- 82 Jamini Mohan Ghosh, op. cit., p. 52.
- 83 N. Majumdar, op. cit., p. 178.
- 84 W. W. Hunter, *A Statistical Account of Bengal, Vol. VII*, op. cit., p. 100.
- 85 N. Majumdar, op. cit., p. 224.
- 86 W. R. Gourlay, op. cit., p. 30.
- 87 W. W. Hunter, op. cit., p. 328.
- 88 Ibid., p. 205.
- 89 N. Majumdar, op. cit., p. 147.
- 90 Walter Keily Firminger (ed.), op. cit., pp. 78-79.
- 91 N. Majumdar, op. cit., p. 295.
- 92 Ananda Bhattacharyya, *Sannyasi o Fakir Bidraho*, op. cit., p. 237.
- 93 A. N. Chandra, op. cit., p. 39.
- 94 Jamini Mohan Ghosh, op. cit., p. 107; Ananda Bhattacharyya, op. cit., pp. 275-276.
- 95 J. A. Vas, op. cit., p. 16.